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Abstract
This study analyses age-specific differences in income trends in nine European countries. 
Based on data from National Accounts and the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions, we quantify age-specific changes in income between 2008 and 2017 
and decompose these changes into employment, wages, and public transfer components. 
Results show that income of the younger age groups stagnated or declined in most coun-
tries since 2008, while income of the older population increased. The decomposition analy-
sis indicates that the main drivers of the diverging trends are higher employment among 
the older population and a strong increase in public pensions, especially for women.
Keywords Generational economy · Income · Intergenerational equity
1 Introduction
Income of young adults fell behind income of the older population in most European coun-
tries between 2008 and 2017, even in countries where employment rates among the young 
increased (Eurostat, 2020d, c). Previous research has, however, put little emphasis on the 
extent and the causes of age-specific differences in income trends. The limited evidence 
focuses on equivalised household income and shows that income of households with chil-
dren and young adults stagnated or decreased in most of Europe after the financial crisis, 
while it increased for the older population (Chen et al., 2018; Wittgenstein Centre, 2020). 
While employment is identified as an important explanation of the age-specific changes 
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in income, other factors have rarely been studied directly. Chen et al. (2018) suggests that 
beside employment, public transfers are important drivers of generational disparities in 
income.
Knowledge about age-specific income trends and their determinants is necessary to 
understand central economic and demographic developments. After the financial crisis, 
poverty rates increased or stagnated at high level among young adults and family house-
holds in many countries. By contrast, poverty rates among older adults declined during the 
same period (Eurostat, 2020b). Such developments require attention, because the economic 
situation of young adults is a crucial determinant of whether and when they form a fam-
ily, and the number of children they have. Consequently, the deteriorating economic situ-
ation of young adults is considered an important factor for the fertility declines in several 
European countries (Matysiak et al., 2020; IMF, 2018; Goldstein et al., 2013). In addition, 
most European countries experienced a baby boom in the decades after the second world 
war, with varying degree and length. The baby-boomer are currently entering retirement 
or will reach retirement age in the next two decades, which will increase old-age related 
spending (European Commission, 2018, 2021) and the demand for higher taxes from the 
working age population. The COVID-19 pandemic will further increase the pressure on 
young generations in the years to come. It is thus of utmost importance to study the drivers 
of income changes at each life-stage, to understand their relation with social, economic and 
demographic developments.
Employment is particularly important for the understanding of age-specific differences 
in income trends, most notably in Southern Europe. Between 2008 and 2017, employment 
rates of the 15–39-year-old decreased by 9 percentage-points in Italy, Greece, and Spain, 
while employment among the population aged 40–59 increased (Eurostat, 2020c). In addi-
tion, young people find themselves increasingly entrapped in insecure and temporary work 
(Barbieri et al., 2019; Garibaldi and Taddei, 2013). This strong deterioration of employ-
ment opportunities for the young in Southern Europe is found to be reinforced by labour 
market institutions that generate a pronounced duality in the labour markets: the older, per-
manent employees are strongly protected, while the insecurity due to a flexibilisation of 
the labour market has been entirely placed on young cohorts (Barbieri, 2011; Chauvel and 
Schröder, 2014). Employment of the young also decreased in many Western and Northern 
European countries, however, to a much lesser degree than in Southern Europe. By con-
trast, in most Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries employment increased for 
young adults, and even more so for older working age adults (Eurostat, 2020c). Aliaj et al. 
(2016) show that employment among the population 50+ increased in Belgium, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands in the last decades uninterrupted by the financial crisis, but 
they do observe a reduction in average hours worked The change of employment rates in 
percentage points was more favourable for the population 40–59, compared to the popula-
tion 15–39, in all European countries except the three Baltic countries, Iceland, and Swit-
zerland. Changes in employment rates differ not only by age groups, but also by gender. 
Employment among the older working age population increased much stronger for women, 
compared to men.
Although employment is an important driver of income trends, it does not entirely 
explain the unequal developments in income across ages. For example, equivalised income 
of the population aged 65+ increased by five per cent in Italy and seven per cent in Spain, 
yet without associated increases in employment (Eurostat  2020d). This suggests that 
in addition to employment, changes in wages and public transfers are important compo-
nents to consider when analysing the underlying causes of diverging income trends across 
age groups. Chen et  al. (2018), for example, suggests that in addition to labour market 
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developments, the design of social protection is an important dimension to consider, since 
it potentially guards the income of older persons while offering little assistance to young 
individuals.
Despite the important implications of age-specific income trends for societal and demo-
graphic development, no previous research, to our knowledge, has systematically analysed 
these changes in a comparative manner for Europe. Moreover, it remains unclear how 
employment, wages, and public transfers contribute to changes in income across different 
generations in the previous decades. Our study aims at closing these gaps by addressing the 
following research questions based on data from the European system of Accounts (ESA) 
and the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC): 
1. How did aggregate per-capita income and its components change between 2008 and 
2017?
2. How do these changes differ between age groups?
3. What drives age-specific income trends: changes in employment, wages, or transfer 
income?
The countries included in the analysis are Austria, Estonia, Greece, France, Italy, Poland, 
Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. EU-SILC provides comparable information on individual 
gross income and on household net income in all EU countries. The nine countries included 
in our analysis also provide information on individual net income, i.e. on net income from 
employment, self-employment, and net public benefits. We focus on individual income 
rather than household income, since the latter potentially hides age-specific changes when 
various generations live in the same household.
Moreover, the set of countries allows us to study different welfare regimes and vari-
ous economic developments during the observed period. In the presentation of the results, 
we group countries based on their developments in aggregate and age-specific income. In 
particular, we group the Southern European countries together (Italy, Greece and Spain), 
the Western and Central European countries (Austria, France and Slovenia), and the East-
ern and Northern European countries (Poland, Estonia and Sweden). The development in 
aggregate and age-specific income was similar within these groups of countries, while it 
differed considerably across these country-groups.
Our paper is divided into three parts, in line with our three research questions. First, we 
measure total changes in income and public redistribution between 2008 and 2017, using 
aggregate economic ESA data. Aggregate data are more comprehensive and reliable than 
survey-based data and thus constitute a benchmark for comparing and verifying the survey-
based results. Second, we analyse age-specific changes in income between 2008 and 2017, 
using micro-level EU-SILC data. In the third part of the paper, we decompose the age-
specific changes in income into its main components, thereby identifying how changes in 
employment, wages and social benefits affect age-specific income trends.
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2  Data and Methodology
2.1  Aggregate Income in the European System of Accounts
Data from ESA provide detailed information on the level and type of household sector 
income as well as on public redistribution (for a detailed description of ESA see European 
Commission, 2013). The annual sector accounts are available from the Eurostat database 
(Eurostat, 2020a). Our focus is on four quantities: (1) primary income before public redis-
tribution, (2) payments of taxes and social contributions, (3) receipt of social benefits, and 
(4) disposable income. Taken together, these four quantities summarize changes in total 
income, the extent of public redistribution, and its consequence for disposable income. For 
comparison, we also consider GDP per capita and its changes, because it is the most com-
mon measure of economic development. 
1. Primary income in ESA measures income that is generated by direct participation in 
the production process, before any payment of taxes or social contributions. The largest 
component of primary income of the household sector is the compensation of employ-
ees, which consists of all types of remuneration for work, including social contributions 
paid by employers. Furthermore, primary income includes asset income, such as inter-
est, dividends, the return to owners of unincorporated enterprises and owner-occupied 
housing.
2. The income tax ratio measures income taxes relative to primary income and thus serves 
as an indicator of the total size of public redistribution. For calculating the income tax 
ratio, we combine several quantities from ESA and information on the tax structure 
(European Commission, 2019). In particular, our definition of the tax ratio takes into 
account taxes on production, taxes on income and wealth, as well as social contributions. 
Taxes paid on public transfers such as pensions are not included, because national varia-
tions in tax systems could bias cross-country comparisons. The concept differs from the 
more common tax-to-GDP ratio, since our goal is not the measurement of the total tax 
burden, but to capture all direct taxes that are paid out of primary income. Consequently, 
taxes on products are not included in the income tax ratio, because they constitute part 
of consumption expenditure and affect disposable income only indirectly.
3. The benefit ratio is calculated as the ratio of total cash benefits from the government 
to primary income of households. It serves as an indicator of the importance of public 
redistribution via cash transfers. In ESA, the largest type of benefits are social benefits, 
including pensions, unemployment benefits, family allowances and other types of social 
benefits. To be consistent with our definition of the tax ratio, we measure benefits net 
of taxes and social contributions that are paid on these benefits. In addition, the benefit 
ratio includes other current transfers from the government sector to households.
4. Disposable income is an indicator of economic wellbeing of households. It is calculated 
as primary income less taxes plus cash benefits and represents the income of households 
that can be used for consumption and saving.
2.2  Age‑Specific Income in EU‑SILC
The age-specific analysis of income changes is based on EU-SILC data. We distinguish 
three age-groups: the young working age population at age 20–39, the older working age 
Age‑Specific Income Trends in Europe: The Role of Employment,…
1 3
population at age 40–59, and the elderly population aged 60+. We opted for 20-year age 
groups to have sufficient observations for reliable estimates when distinguishing also by 
type of income and gender. Ages 20–39 coincide with the life stage of early labour market 
career, family formation and childbearing. The age group 40–59 consists mainly of per-
sons that made their family decisions already, who do not have care responsibilities for 
small children anymore, and who are active on the labour market. The age border of 60 
corresponds to actual retirement age in most countries; thus, the age-group 60+ captures 
therefore mainly the group of retirees. For each of the three age groups, we calculate the 
changes in age-specific mean income in real terms between 2008 and 2017. Means are 
required by the decomposition analysis we apply to individual income as described below. 
However, we also provide estimates of changes in median income as well as the changes in 
the first and the third quartile.
All income components are assigned to individuals, also components that are given at 
household level in EU-SILC, including family benefits, imputed rents, asset income and 
income of persons younger than 16. The details of allocating household level income to 
individuals are given in “Allocation of Household-Level Income to Individuals”  in the 
Appendix. Sensitivity analysis has indicated that the assumptions for the distribution of 
household level income have little effect on the level and change of age-specific income. 
First, income at household level accounts for less than 20 percent of total income, with 
imputed rents as largest component. Second, the age group of recipients of household-level 
income can be identified unambiguously in most households. The same is true for gender-
specific results except for Poland, where an increase in the monetary support of families 
resulted in an increase of income among the 20–39-year-old. Hence, the gender-specific 
results for Poland depend on how these increased benefits are allocated within a couple.
Age-specific changes over time are often analysed using an age-period-cohort (APC) 
approach. An APC approach distinguishes period effects that influence income earners at 
all ages and from all birth cohorts, age-effects that comprise changes in fundamental life-
cycle patterns, and cohort-effects that only affect persons born in given years, such as an 
economic shock that affects all persons newly entering the labour market (De Fraja et al., 
2017; Mroz and Savage, 2006). Since the three APC dimensions are perfectly collinear, it 
is not possible to unambiguously disentangle the distinct effects. Although previous litera-
ture has suggested methods to overcome this identification issue, their applications are fre-
quently disputed and their results often unintuitive (Bell, 2020; Fosse and Winship, 2019). 
The difficulty to distinguish between cohort and age-effects is aggravated by the short time 
span covered by EU-SILC, which only provides suitable pseudo-panel data for a period of 
ten years. Since economic shocks, such as the financial crisis or the sovereign debt crisis, 
affected consecutive birth cohorts in a similar way, it is currently not possible to identify 
if the effect is indeed short-lived and affects only few cohorts, or if it resulted in a lasting 
change of the age patterns. We thus refrain from decomposing APC effects, acknowledg-
ing that the difference in income trends between age groups reflects both, age and cohort 
effects.
2.3  Decomposition of Income Changes
Changes in mean income between 2008 and 2017 are decomposed to identify the role 
of employment, wages, and public transfers. This analysis is solely based on income and 
employment data in EU-SILC. We distinguish between three income components:  Per-
capita averages of total income (Y) are the sum of average income from employment (YL), 
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public benefits (YB) and other income (YO), which includes for example asset income and 
inter-household transfers. The sub-components of YO are comparably small, which is the 
reason for combining them into a single category.
For each age group i, we decompose the percentage change in total income between 
2008 and 2017 into the sum of the changes of its components, with % referring to changes 
in percent of total income in 2008:1 
To identify the effect of changes in employment rates on %Yi , we further decompose 
the components %YLi and %YBi , which are both strongly related to employment rates. 
While employment-income arises exclusively to persons in employment, benefits are 
directed mainly at the non-employed population, such as pensioners, unemployed persons, 
or persons on paternal leave. Average income from employment can be written as product 
of the employment rate ( l
i
 ) and average income of each employed person ( yl
i
):
Likewise, average benefits can be written as product of the share of non-employed persons 
(1 − l
i
) and average benefits per non-employed person ( yb
i
):




 is allocated to each factor according to its relative 
change, i.e.  if income per employed person increases by 10 percent and the employment 
rate by 5 percent, we would allocate 2/3 of %YL to income per employed person and 
1/3 to the employment rate. We can then write the total changes in income as sum of five 
components:
The method of decomposing %YLi and %YBi is described in more detail and with an 
example in “Decomposition of Income Changes” of the Appendix.
3  Results
3.1  Changes in Aggregate Income
The financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis had a much stronger effect on income of 
the household sector than indicated by changes in GDP. While GDP per capita declined 
from 2008 to 2017 only in Greece and Italy (Column 1 in Table  1), per capita primary 
income of households declined in six out of the nine analysed countries (Column 2). The 
decline was most pronounced in Greece with 32 per cent, and in Italy and Spain, with a 
decline of more than 10 per cent. Primary income decreased slightly in Austria, France 
and Slovenia and slightly increased in Poland. Only households in Estonia and Sweden had 
considerably more income per capita in 2017 than in 2008 with an increase of 16 per cent.
(1)%Yi = %YLi + %YBi + %YOi
(2)YLi = yli ∗ li
(3)YBi = ybi ∗ (1 − li)
(4)%Yi = %li + %yli + %(1 − li) + %ybi + %YOi
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The extent of public redistribution increased in all nine countries during the period 
2008–2017. The tax ratio stagnated in Spain and Sweden, and increased in the other coun-
tries (Column 3 of Table  1), with the highest increase of 7 per cent in Greece. Part of 
the higher taxes were used to finance increasing cash transfers; the benefit ratio increased 
in all analysed countries. This increase of social benefits relative to primary income was 
most pronounced in Italy with an increase of 5 percentage points, and in France and Spain 
with an increase of 4 percentage points. The changes in the tax ratio and the benefit ratio 
measure mainly the redistribution within the household sector, with a small effect on the 
household sector as a whole. Therefore, changes in disposable income follow largely the 
changes in primary income. Disposable income of the household sector increased in Esto-
nia, Poland and Sweden, and declined in the other six countries.
3.2  Age‑Specific Changes
The analysis of income changes by age reveals large disparities between age groups 
(Table  2). Income of the 20–39-year-old declined in five of the nine analysed countries 
and only in Estonia it increased by more than 5 per cent. The income trends were more 
favourable for the older working age population at age 40–59, where only in Greece, Italy, 
Table 1  Real income per capita, taxes and benefits and their change during the 2008–2017 period (in 2018 
prices). Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the ESA 2010 annual sector accounts
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP per capita Primary 
income (PI)






Austria 42,100 26,638 38 28 23,887
France 34,385 23,008 45 33 20,258
Slovenia 20,819 12,627 35 27 11,572
Greece 16,451 10,498 33 28 9962
Spain 24,971 16,042 32 24 14,818
Italy 28,662 19,637 36 26 17,730
Estonia 18,133 10,537 32 24 9690
Poland 12,309 7,650 30 24 7249
Sweden 48,026 29,426 38 23 25,005
Changes 2008–2017
(%) (%) (%-points) (%-points) (%)
Austria 2 −3 2 2 −2
France 3 −1 4 4 −1
Slovenia 1 −3 1 3 −2
Greece −24 −32 7 3 −35
Spain 0 −10 0 4 −7
Italy −7 −14 3 5 ara> −12
Estonia 15 16 1 1 17
Poland 11 3 1 2 4
Sweden 8 16 0 1 17
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and Spain income per capita declined. However, the gains in income were concentrated in 
the population 60+, with absolute gains in all countries except Greece. Even in Greece the 
decline in income was much less for the population 60+ compared to the prime working 
age population. Income of the elderly population increased also in Italy and Spain, despite 
the strong declines in the working age population. It increased strongly in Austria, France 
and Slovenia, while income of the working age population merely stagnated with a change 
of 4 percent or less over the whole period from 2008 to 2017.
The overall pattern of absolute and relative income losses of the young are similar 
across the whole income distribution. However, mean values can be strongly influenced by 
large incomes, their changes may not be representative for individuals in the middle or at 
the bottom end of the distribution. We therefore present changes by quartiles in the Appen-
dix, Tables 5, 6 and 7. While the overall findings hold across the income distribution, we 
observe a pronounced decline of the first quartile among young adults in Greece, Italy and 
Spain. This decline can be explained by an increase of the share of persons with a low 
level of employment and low income to more than one quarter of the population and hence 
encompasses the first quartile of the income distribution in 2017.
Differences between ESA (Table 1) and EU-SILC data (Table 2) are due to the fact 
that EU-SILC captures only part of the income of households. These differences are 
described in detail in Table  8  in the Appendix. In particular, asset income is poorly 
Table 2  Mean individual net income by age Source: Authors’ own calculation based on EU-SILC cross-
section data for 2009 and 2018 (income reference years 2008 and 2017)
Individual net income in 2017
Country Age 20–39 Age 40–59 Age 60+ Total (20+)
Austria 21,458 30,028 24,665 25,695
France 21,121 30,726 30,012 27,512
Slovenia 11,345 14,954 11,889 12,839
Greece 6,506 10,661 9,965 9235
Spain 12,225 18,523 17,422 16,326
Italy 12,676 21,089 20,769 18,692
Estonia 11,025 11,879 7,308 10,111
Poland 6,523 7,532 6,465 6843
Sweden 23,689 33,693 25,197 27,556
Change in real net income 2008–2017 in %
Country Age 20–39 Age 40–59 Age 60+ Total (20+)
Austria −1 1 11 3
France −4 1 8 3
Slovenia 1 4 7 4
Greece −43 −38 −24 −34
Spain −18 −8 8 −4
Italy −17 −9 4 −5
Estonia 17 28 7 17
Poland 5 2 1 2
Sweden 4 16 14 12
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captured in EU-SILC with the exception of France. Since the decline in income per 
capita in Austria, Italy and Slovenia (Table  1) was largely the result of a decline in 
asset income, EU-SILC based income estimates decline less, respectively increased 
stronger, compared to ESA. Furthermore, changes in the survey may also affect age-
specific income. The large increase in income of the working age population in Estonia 
is partly the result of a better estimation of labour income in EU-SILC; the EU-SILC 
estimates in 2017 corresponded exactly to the ESA values, while in 2008 the EU-SILC-
based estimates corresponded to only 89 percent of the value in ESA. Furthermore, 
the huge decline in labour income in Greece may be overstated; the estimate of total 
labour income in EU-SILC was 75 percent of the ESA aggregate in 2017, compared 
to 89 percent in 2008, suggesting that EU-SILC captured a lower part of total labour 
income in 2017. By contrast, the estimates of social benefits in EU-SILC increased 
from 67 to 77 percent of the ESA value, which may explain part of the decline in 
income of the young relative to the elderly.
The estimation of standard errors is a challenge in any EU-SILC-based analysis. 
First, the data lacks sample design variables to calculate the correct standard errors due 
to sampling. Second, further random errors are introduced through imputation and re-
weighting of the data (Goedemé 2013), which is particularly problematic for variables 
with a high share of imputed values, such as asset income. We calculated the standard 
errors for the age-specific estimates of income changes using the method suggested by 
Goedemé (2013) and Trindade and Goedemé (2016), and report the results in Table 9 
in the Appendix. The standard errors are particularly high in France, which can be 
explained by the high coverage of unequally distributed asset income and the conse-
quent much higher dispersion of total income. However, a large part of the income data 
is imputed and not sampled. Treating the data as if it would emerge from a random 
sample overestimates the standard errors. So far, we are not aware of methodology that 
enable the estimation of standard errors and confidence intervals of EU-SILC variables 
with a large share of imputed data. To evaluate our point estimates of income, we care-
fully compare them with the more reliable aggregate data.
Table 3  Changes in mean net 
income by age and gender 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
based on EU-SILC cross-section 
data
Country Men Women
Age Age Age Age Age Age
20–39 40–59 60+ 20–39 40–59 60+
Austria −1 0 6 1 4 16
France −8 −1 2 2 5 14
Slovenia 3 2 2 −2 7 12
Greece −41 −41 −28 −44 −34 −19
Spain −22 −14 4 −12 1 12
Italy −19 −12 3 −15 −4 5
Estonia 11 29 6 24 26 8
Poland 0 1 −5 10 2 5
Sweden 1 15 12 8 18 17
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3.3  Age‑Specific Changes by Gender
The increase in average income in old age is mainly explained by the substantial increase 
in female labour force participation in the last decades. As a consequence, women earn 
more and receive higher pensions than in the past, visible in the strong increase in income 
of women aged 60+ (Table 3). Although the change was much less pronounced for men, 
also income of men in the age group 60+ increased, compared to the working age popula-
tion. Exceptions are Estonia and Poland, where the income of the older male and female 
population increased less than the income of the working age population.
3.4  Decomposition of Income Changes
Most of the age-specific differences in income trends can be explained through chang-
ing employment rates ( %li ) and an increase in transfer income for the age group 60+ 
( %YB60+ ). Despite huge cross-country differences in the extent of income changes, we 
observe several common patterns (Fig. 1 and associated Table 4). In all countries, employ-
ment among the older working age population and the population 60+ increased, which 
is mainly the result of higher female employment and later retirement for both genders. 
Higher employment among older age groups reduced the share of non-employed persons 
and pension receivers ( %(1 − l60+) ) and should have reduced the share of pensions in total 
income. Instead, in almost all countries, this effect was offset by an increase in benefits 
per retiree ( %yb60+ ). Higher employment is the main reason for increasing income of the 
older working age population aged 40-59; higher employment together with the increase in 
benefits per retiree is the explanation for the increasing income of the population 60+.
Changes in income per employee ( %yli ) are an important driver for changes in income 
of the working age population. The decline in the income of the young working age popu-
lation in Greece, Italy, and Spain is a combined effect of lower employment rates and lower 
income per employee. The decline for the older working age population is mainly due to 
lower income per employee. Likewise, income of the working age population increased in 
Sweden and Estonia, mainly because of higher income. In Poland, income of the young 
working age increased because of higher benefits.
In general, the other income components ( YO
i
 ) constitute a small part of household 
income and explain a small part of the income changes with the exception of France and 
Estonia. In France, this pattern reflects the decline in asset income, an income component 
which is much better captured in France, compared to other countries. The results for Esto-
nia have to be taken with a grain of salt. The decline in other income is mainly due to a 
decline in imputed rents in EU-SILC, which we regard unrealistic in its extent and at odds 
with aggregate data from ESA.
4  Discussion
Understanding age-specific income trends is of central importance in the context of age-
ing populations and the sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension schemes. Public pen-
sion schemes were designed during a period that was characterised by high growth rates 
of GDP, baby-boom cohorts entering working age, a decline in the number of dependent 
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Fig. 1  Decomposition of income changes by age
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children, and an increase in the labour force participation of women. These favourable con-
ditions are, however, quickly waning; the size of cohorts entering retirement age in the next 
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SE, women
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Share of beneficiaries (n) Benefits per beneficiary (yb)
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Fig. 1  (continued)
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France and Sweden (Fig. 2). The change in the age structure of the population will pose 
a challenge for European economies, in particular the labour markets and public transfer 
systems. Ageing, its consequences, and possible solutions are therefore widely discussed 
among policy makers. Only recently, the European commission presented a green paper 
to launch a broad policy debate on the challenges and opportunities of Europe’s ageing 
society (European Commission 2021). One of these challenges is the prevention of further 
income deterioration of young generations. Our results show that the period from 2008 to 
2017 was characterised by stagnating/declining income for the young in many countries, 
increasing taxes, and increasing social benefits for the elderly population. The pressure on 
income of the young will additionally intensify with the ongoing retirement of the baby-
boomer and the consequences of the COVID-19-crisis.
Our results also show that population ageing is only one of the challenges for public 
transfers in the next decades. The pension systems are also pressured by considerable 
increases in per-capita benefits. Generous pension rules implemented during demographi-
cally favourable periods and the increase in employment resulted in higher pension rights, 
which explains part of the overall increase in transfer income of the age group 60+. Fig-
ure  3 shows the changes in age- and cohort-specific employment rates for the example 
of France, but the pattern looks very similar in the other countries. In particular, female 
employment rates have increased in the decades after the baby-boom. Consequently, the 
cohorts of women that reach retirement age are characterized by higher employment over 
the whole working life, compared to the already retired cohorts. The increases of female 
employment rates levelled off for younger age groups after 2008, but increasing employ-
ment rates are a major driver of higher labour income in late working age and the increase 
in public benefits in the age group 60+. The increases in pensions of women are highly 
desirable, given their low pensions compared to men. They lead, however, to an increase in 
the average pension compared to income from employment and thereby contribute to the 
difficulties in balancing contributions and benefits.
While there is no evidence of a straightforward relationship between income and fertil-
ity, low income and economic insecurity can explain part of the fertility decline in Euro-
pean countries. The decline in birth rates continued in the years since 2017 and accelerated 
in the COVID-19 crises, with a particular large drop in Spain (Sobotka et al., 2021). Espe-
cially the Southern-European countries may find themselves in a economic vicious circle 
of demographic and economic developments, where ageing populations result in a shift of 
income from young to old, which in turn may result in a lower number of children and an 
acceleration of the ageing process.
The better position of young generations in Poland and Estonia is probably a result of 
the more dynamic development of the economy in these countries, reflected also in higher 
growth of GDP per capita. Such developments open work opportunities for younger gen-
erations and triggers demand for skills and knowledge that are more widespread among 
younger persons, e.g. skills regarding information and communications technology, result-
ing in an increase of their average real wage. An additional factor may be the high net-
outmigration in these countries, supporting the wages of the remaining population (e.g. 
Dustmann et al., 2015; Elsner 2013).
In our sample, all countries with declining national income are characterized by a 
decrease in income of the young relative to the older population. However, escaping 
from the vicious circle mentioned above requires institutions that distribute the costs 
of economic crises across all age groups rather than concentrating the losses of income 
among the young. A rich literature explores mechanism to adapt pension systems 
automatically to a changing economic and demographic environment and to balance 
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contributions and expenses (e.g. Börsch-Supan 2007; Vidal-Meliá et al., 2009). Such 
mechanism could also reduce the differences in age-specific income trends, by avoid-
ing a decoupling of changes in primary income and in pension benefits. In Europe, 
Sweden is a role model in implementing such stabilizers in the pension system, by 
adjusting pensions to life expectancy and by linking them to changes in primary 
income. The constant share of taxes in this country compared to the increase in most 
other countries  suggests that these mechanisms might work as desired (see Table 1). 
Our work documents age-specific income trends, but further work is needed to identify 
possible ways towards a sustainable allocation and redistribution of income between 
generations.
5  Conclusion
Our study reveals large differences in age-specific income trends in all nine countries 
analysed. Although the extent of age-specific differences varies greatly across coun-
tries, we observe common patterns.
In most countries, the period 2008–2017 is characterized by a stagnation or decline 
in the income of households and an increase in public sector redistribution. While 
GDP per capita decreased only in Greece and Italy between 2008 and 2017, income per 
capita decreased in six out of the nine analysed countries. Only in Estonia and Sweden, 
income increased significantly with about 15 percent over the whole period. During 
the period from 2008 to 2017, income taxes relative to primary income increased in 
seven of nine countries and stagnated in two, while benefits relative to primary income 
increased in all countries.
The age group 20–39 lost income relative to older age groups in all countries except 
Estonia and Poland. In five out of nine countries, the young lost even in absolute terms. 
The differences in age-specific income trends are particularly high in Southern Europe. 
In Italy and Spain, mean income in the population at age 20–39 declined by about 17 
percent and for the older working age population at age 40–59 by about eight percent. 
By contrast, income increased for the elderly population aged 60+. In Greece, income 
declined for all age groups, but less for the older populations. In Austria, France, Slo-
venia and Sweden, mean income of the population 20–39 merely stagnated, while it 
increased strongly for the population aged 60 and older.
A decomposition analysis revealed that the main drivers of these age-specific differ-
ences in income trends are (i) a decline or stagnation of employment rates and income 
of the 20–39-year-old, (ii) an increase in employment in the older age groups 40–59 
and 60+, and (iii) a strong increase in benefits for the population 60+. The increase in 
employment and income among older population is mainly due to a increased labour 
force participation and higher pensions for women.
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In summary, this paper revealed important intergenerational disparities in the devel-
opment of individual income, especially in countries that were hit hard during the pre-
vious financial crisis. These findings are crucial with regard to the current COVID-
19 pandemic, with its unprecedented societal and economic consequences. For many 
young Europeans, the pandemic adds to their already precarious economic situation. 
Knowledge about age-specific income trends may help to find better and generationally 
balanced answers to economic crises.
Appendix
Allocation of Household‑Level Income to Individuals
Some income components in EU-SILC are only given at household level and need to be 
assigned to individuals for this analysis. Family benefits are assigned to the parents of the 
economically dependent children in the household. Since parental leave benefits as part of 
total family benefits are targeted at the person taking over most of the care responsibilities, 
we distribute family benefits within couples according to the inverse share of their labour 
income. If one of the partners has no income because of the engagement in care work, this 
partner is assumed to receive all family benefits.
Imputed rent is regarded as a type of asset income and assigned to the household mem-
bers that report to be responsible for the accommodation. Asset income is assumed to be 
equally shared among all adults in the household.2 Finally, personal income of persons 
below 16 is assigned to the 15-year-old members, or the oldest child in case there are no 
15-year-old present in the household.
We want to emphasize again that these allocation rules have no strong effect on our 
results. An alternative allocation of household-level income to all adults in equal shares 
resulted in negligible differences in the total changes of income.
Decomposition of Income Changes
This section describes the decomposition of the changes in average income from employ-
ment %YLi and average benefits %YBi for each age group i, and provides an illustrative 
example at the end of the section.
The decomposition relies on information about employment during the income refer-
ence period (the calendar year preceding the year of the survey). To calculate employ-
ment rates, we use the information on economic status in each month (Variables PL073-
PL076  in EU-SILC). For example, an observation counts as fully employed if he or she 
reports employment for 12 months. If an observation, however, reports only six months in 
employment, he or she is considered as half employed and half non-employed. We refrain 
from further accounting for the extent of employment, since we do not have information 
on the exact numbers of hours worked. Note, that also individuals who are fully employed 
may receive public transfers, e.g. child allowance. Most of public transfers, however, target 
2 Adult persons are defined as all individuals 35 and older. A person from age 16 to 34 is counted adult 
only if he or she is in employment, focusing on domestic work, or if there are only persons below age 35 
who are not in employment in the household.
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−1 −2 1 0 0 −1 0 0
Age 40-59 1 4 −2 −1 3 1 −2 0
Age 60+ 11 5 5 1 6 −1 −3 7
Total 
(20+)
3 2 1 0 1 1 −1 2
France
Age 20-39 −4 −2 1 −2 −3 1 2 −1
Age 
40–59
1 9 −2 −6 4 5 −3 1
Age 60+ 8 6 8 −5 7 −1 −4 11
Total 
(20+)




1 −1 1 0 −3 2 1 0
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Fig. 2  Relative size of birth cohorts in 2020 (avg. size of cohorts aged 0 − 24 = 1). Source: Eurostat
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individuals outside employment via pensions, parental leave benefits or unemployment 
benefits. These are also the components that account for the income changes over time.
Remember that in our analysis we measure the change of each income component rela-
tive to total income Y
i





 . We can also write %YLi as 
percentage change of YL
i














 . Likewise, %YBi is the percentage 
change of YB
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 . Because public benefits are mainly directed at persons not in 
employment, such as pensioners, unemployed persons or parents on leave, we can write 
average benefits as product of the share of non-employed persons (1 − l
i
) and average ben-
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In continuous time, i.e.  if we would look at an infinitesimal time interval, we 
could calculate the percentage change of YL
i
 as derivative of the logarithm with 


























Such an approach is not completely correct for our discrete, ten-year interval. The per-
centage changes %yli and %li do not exactly add up to %YLi . However, even for our 
10-year time interval the difference is very small. Therefore, we approximate the additive 
contributions of each factor to %YLi by their percentage change. To ensure that the com-
ponents add up, we calculate %yli as residual: %yli = %YLi − %li . To measure the con-





 . Using this procedure also for the benefits, we can write the total changes in income 

















































Fig. 3  Change in employment by age an birth cohorts, France Source: Eurostat
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For example, in Spain the change in average employment-income for all adults aged 20+ 
(the group ”Total” in Table 4) %YL20+ was -13 percent. The employment rate decreased 
by four percent ( l20+ = −4 ). We approximated the change in income per employed per-
son:  yl20+ = YL20+ − l20+ = −13 − (−4) = −9 . Because income from employment 
( YL20+ ) amounted to 57 percent of total income ( Y20+ ), we rescaled these numbers to 
measure their change in terms of total income:  %YL20+ = 9 ∗ 0.57 ≈ 5 percent and 
%l20+ = 4 ∗ 0.57 ≈ 2 percent . The two components together add up to the change of -7 
percent in employment income %YL20+.
Age‑Specific Income Changes: Percentiles
See Table 5, 6 and 7
(5)%Yi = %li + %yli + %(1 − li) + %ybi + %YOi
Table 5  Net income and its 
changes 2008 - 2017, 1st Quartile 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC
Change in real net income 2008–2017 in %
Country Age 20-39 Age 40-59 Age 60+ Total
Austria 2 4 11 6
France −8 4 10 3
Slovenia −5 4 9 5
Greece −89 −43 −9 −39
Spain −49 −2 14 − 13
Italy −47 −10 3 −16
Estonia 13 21 −1 3
Poland 36 9 3 15
Sweden 1 15 12 9
Table 6  Median net income and 
its changes 2008 - 2017 Source: 
Eurostat, EU-SILC
Change in real net income 2008–2017 in %
Country Age 20–39 Age 40–59 Age 60+ Total
Austria 3 2 10 4
France − 2 1 10 3
Slovenia 2 6 6 4
Greece − 50 − 33 − 16 − 28
Spain − 24 − 7 9 − 4
Italy −26 −7 7 −3
Estonia 23 28 −6 14
Poland 16 10 3 9
Sweden 6 18 12 12
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Explaining the Difference between Aggregate Income in ESA and EU‑SILC
Table 8 compares EU-SILC and ESA data by measuring the share of aggregate income that 
is covered in EU-SILC by type of income (coverage ratio, CR). Furthermore, it shows the 
change of the CR between 2008 and 2017. In general, wages and social benefits are similar 
in both surveys. Differences between ESA and EU-SILC are mainly due to large differences 
observed for asset income (Törmälehto, 2019). The CR for total income increased consid-
erably in Austria, Italy and France. In Austria and Italy, this increase can be explained with 
the decline in asset income. Since only a small part of asset income is captured in EU-
SILC, the decline in this component increases the share of total income that is captured. 
In both countries, the CR of employment income and social benefits actually decreased. 
In France, where asset income may be over-covered by EU-SILC (Törmälehto, 2019), the 
increase in the total CR is explained by an increase in the CR of both employment income 
Table 7  Net income and its 
changes 2008 - 2017, 3rd Quartile 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC
Change in real net income 2008–2017 in %
Country Age 20–39 Age 40–59 Age 60+ Total
Austria 0 −1 10 2
France −1 2 8 2
Slovenia 1 5 5 4
Greece −38 −38 −22 −31
Spain −11 −8 9 −1
Italy −11 −8 6 −3
Estonia 20 32 6 24
Poland 6 1 2 2
Sweden 6 18 17 15
Table 8  The coverage ratio of EU-SILC over time: aggregate income in ESA compared to EU-SILC








Austria 86 98 83 5 −1 0
France 99 91 86 5 4 5
Slovenia 86 82 87 3 −2 0
Greece 74 75 77 1 −14 10
Spain 88 89 84 1 1 5
Italy 86 97 87 6 −3 −2
Estonia 82 101 72 0 12 10
Poland 74 91 75 −1 2 0
Sweden 85 110 83 −4 −1 −6
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and social benefits. In Estonia, the coverage of income from employment and of social ben-
efits increased, but not the coverage of total income. We thus observe a unrealistic, strong 
decline of imputed rents in EU-SILC, reducing the coverage of total income. In Greece, the 
CR of employment income decreased strongly (-14 per cent), while the CR of social ben-
efits increased by 10 per cent.
Standard Errors of Income Changes
See Table 9 .
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementarymaterial available at https:// doi. org/ 
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Table 9  Standard errors of 
income changes
Standard errors of the estimated income changes 2008–2017
Country Age 20–39 Age 40–59 Age 60+ Total
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Poland 2.2 1.9 2.2 1.5
Sweden 1.6 2.8 2.4 1.4
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